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Abstract
The climate challenge requires ambitious climate policy. A sudden increase
in carbon prices can lead to major shocks to the stock market. Some assets
will lose part of their value, others all of it, and hence become “stranded”.
If the markets are not ready to absorb the shock, a financial crisis could
follow. How well investors anticipate, and thus how large these shocks may
be, is an empirical question. We analyze stock market reactions to the
rejection of two carbon tax initiatives by voters in Washington state. We
build proper counterfactuals for Washington state firms and find that these
modest policy proposals with limited jurisdiction caused substantial
readjustments on the stock market, especially for carbon-intensive stocks.
Our results reinforce concerns about “stranded assets” and the risk of
financial contagion. Our policy implications support the inclusion of
transition risks in macroprudential policymaking and carbon disclosure and
climate stress tests as the main policy responses.
Keywords: Carbon pricing; financial returns; systemic risk;
macroprudential policies; voting
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Introduction
The climate challenge requires the immediate implementation of ambitious climate
policies. However, global and national financial institutions have expressed concerns that
an abrupt and coordinated increase in carbon prices could lead to major shocks to the
stock market, with the potential for systemic risk. Some assets will lose part of their
value, others all of it, and hence become “stranded”. If the markets are not ready to
absorb the shock, a financial crisis could follow. The number of jurisdictions pricing
carbon has increased substantially over the last few years, mainly following the Paris
Agreement, to reach 57 jurisdictions and a coverage of about 20 percent of global
greenhouse gas emissions (World Bank 2019). Very recently, the World Bank’s Highlevel Commission on Carbon Prices called for a global carbon price in the order of $40 to
$80 per ton of CO2 (Stiglitz et al. 2017). While the increase in coverage and stringency of
carbon pricing should be good news for climate change mitigation, in a recent and very
influential speech the Bank of England’s governor Mark Carney expressed strong
concerns for the potential role that stranded assets could play in destabilizing the global
economy (Carney 2015).
A global financial crisis caused by climate policy would not only disrupt the lives of
millions of people, but also represent a major setback for climate action. Macroprudential
measures, such as climate stress tests, have become part of the policy options considered
by institutes such as the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB 2016), and are under
consideration in Canada, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom (Caldecott et al. 2016; Campiglio et al. 2017, 2018). In the United Kingdom,
the Streamlined Energy and Carbon Reporting regulations seek to mandate carbon
2

disclosure for all quoted as well as large unquoted companies. In the United States,
Senator Elizabeth Warren sponsored the Climate Risk Disclosure Act, a bill requiring
public companies to disclose critical information about their exposure to climate-related
risks.
How well investors anticipate, and thus how large these shocks may be, is an
empirical question. In this paper, we analyze stock market reactions to the largely
unexpected defeat of two carbon tax initiatives in Washington state, Initiatives 732 (I732) and 1631 (I-1631). We leverage an important difference in the design of these
carbon taxes, namely that one implied a revenue-neutral reform (I-732) while the other
could have been classified as an environmental spending bill (I-1631), along the lines of
the currently debated Green New Deal.
Our main findings are as follows: (i) both events led to significant readjustments in
the value of Washington-based firms, (ii) these adjustments are stronger for carbonintensive stocks, and (iii) all adjustments tend to be stronger for I-1631 than for the
revenue-neutral I-732. These results have crucial implications for designing costeffective policies in the face of climate change. In particular, the important swings in the
stock market price of Washington-based firms observed in our context suggest that even a
relatively modest policy with limited jurisdiction can represent an important shock to the
stock market. Hence, the concern about systemic risk in the case of a coordinated
implementation of ambitious carbon prices across countries seems justified. While our
analyses do not offer a direct test of the usefulness of macroprudential measures such as
mandated carbon disclosure and climate stress tests, they do support the rationale for such
interventions.
3

Our empirical strategy takes advantage of the uniqueness of Washington state’s
framework and leverage the important differences that exist between these two initiatives.
I-732, championed by stand-up economist Yoram Bauman and his grassroot organization
Carbon Washington, was designed as a revenue-neutral, business-friendly carbon tax
(Anderson et al. 2019). Following the example of the British Columbia carbon tax,
implemented in 2008, I-732 had a pre-announced tax escalator and redistributed the
money back to the economy. While British Columbia did so mainly through income tax
rebates, the absence of an income tax in Washington state led the policy entrepreneurs
behind I-732 to opt for a reduction in the sales tax. I-732 was announced in March 2015
and the ballot took place on November 8, 2016. While I-732 was supported by some
business lobbies, environmentalists were strongly divided. Very powerful actors in the
environmental justice community, such as the Sierra Club, opposed the initiative. Their
opposition was not directed at carbon taxes per se, but rather at the specific, revenueneutral design of I-732. Following the rejection of I-732 by Washington state’s voters,
environmental justice groups announced I-1631, a new carbon tax initiative, in March
2018. I-1631 also included a tax escalator. It was, however, no longer designed to be
revenue neutral. Expected revenues of about US$1 billion would have been distributed
among a clean air and clean energy fund (about $700 million), a clean water and healthy
forest fund (about $250 million), as well as support towards low-income households,
communities, and affected workers. Hence, the main difference between the two
proposals lies on the different use of revenues. I-1631 was rejected on November 6, 2018.
We access Thomson Reuters database and collect financial data on all Russell 3000
companies, which we combine with firm-level characteristics from Compustat and other
4

data sources from Thomson Reuters. We conduct a short-run event study analysis to
estimate the abnormal returns on the event dates. Specifically, we estimate the causal
effect of new information about carbon taxes on the returns of Washington- based firms.
To this end, we estimate proper control portfolios for Washington-based firms, by
matching on observable firm characteristics. Our treated sample consists of downstream
firms, which use energy as an input to their production function. Our approach addresses
potential confounders in both average and heterogeneous effects. We confirm our model’s
performance by conducting extensive placebo tests at non-event dates and with false
treatment groups, among others.
Our unique approach contributes to the nascent literature on climate policy and
systemic risk in several ways. First, we focus on new information released about the most
prominent climate policy tool, carbon taxation. Second, we focus on the effect of new
information on downstream firms. This approach is crucial to understand the true
potential for systemic risk. Indeed, an important climate policy shock would not only
affect fossil fuel companies, but the economy as a whole. Including downstream firms
can lead to a tenfold increase in the exposure of financial intermediaries to a potential
climate policy shock (Battiston et al. 2017). Third, we leverage differences in the design
of the same policy tool, a carbon tax, to identify financial implications stemming from the
considerably different economic impacts that actual policymaking can bring about.
Fourth, we make use of our policy’s clear tax base, carbon emissions, to analyze
heterogeneous effects along this dimension. Heterogeneity, and in particular how affected
are the most affected firms, is crucial for assessing systemic risk. Further, heterogeneous
effects allow us to assess whether investors take advantage of available information about
5

carbon intensity and exposure to potential carbon taxes.1
Our paper complements a subset of other studies, which analyze either stock market
reactions to policy announcements with a focus on upstream energy suppliers, or release
of scientific information with potential policy relevance. For instance, Griffin et al.
(2015) study the impact on the stock market of two concurrent publications in Nature,
calculating the implications for coal, gas, and oil reserves of keeping global temperatures
within 2°C above pre-industrial levels (Allen et al. 2009 and Meinshausen et al. 2009).
Byrd and Cooperman (2018) analyze the effect of new information about technological
improvements in the capture and storage of carbon on the value of coal companies. Linn
(2010) and Sen and Schickfus (2017) focus on energy utilities, and how their market
value is affected by plans to implement an emissions trading scheme in the United States
or a carbon tax in Germany, respectively. Hence, the existing evidence is either for energy
suppliers or based on indirect inference from non-policy events.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We discuss the literature and
economic background in Section 2. Section 3 describes the data and empirical approach.
Section 4 provides our empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
Background
Climate policy and stranded assets
About 20 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions are currently covered by a
carbon price or soon will be. Among the countries currently pricing carbon, most of them

1

In this way, we also contribute to this growing strand of literature. See, for instance, Beatty and Shimshack (2010),
Kim and Lyon (2011), Oberndorfer et al. (2013), Flammer (2015), Krüger (2015), and Ramelli et al. (2018). AmelZadeh (2018) provides an extensive survey.
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have tax rates, or permit prices, around or below $10 per ton of CO2 (World Bank 2019).
Tax rates, however, tend to increase over time, in some cases by construction, as many
carbon tax schemes have tax escalators embedded in the policy design. Emissions trading
schemes operate over phases, allowing the regulator to adjust the cap downward. Recent
features such as the Market Stability Reserve in the European Union Emissions Trading
System give regulators more power to ensure dynamic incentives (Hepburn et al. 2016).
Hence, carbon prices are expected to keep rising over time and to cover an increasing
portion of global emissions. Against this background, calls for a global carbon price in
the order of $40 to $80 dollars per ton of CO2 appear increasingly plausible (Stiglitz et
al. 2017).
Concerns about stranded assets started to receive considerable attention following an
influential speech by the Bank of England’s governor Mark Carney (Carney 2015). In
this 2015 speech, Carney highlighted three sources of risk for financial systems related
with climate change. First, physical risks, related to the impact on financial assets of
climate change, in particular through the intensification of natural disasters and extreme
events (see Dietz et al. 2016). Second, liability risks, which would emerge if victims of
climate change could seek compensation. Third, transition risks, which are the focus of
our paper. According to Carney, changes in climate policy, and increases in stringency,
could lead investors to reevaluate the value of a broad range of assets, potentially
destabilizing the financial system. The term “stranded assets” has been used also more
broadly, to define all capital investment that may lose value during the transition to a
cleaner economy (see Asheim 2013).
Carney’s speech, among other factors, led to both an emerging literature on stranded
7

assets and the design of additional macroprudential policies by central bankers and
financial stability boards. Since 2016, for instance, the European Systemic Risk Board
(ESRB), an agency of the European Central Bank, considers late and abrupt
implementation of climate policy (defined as “hard landing”) as part of the systemic risks
to the global financial system (ESRB 2016). The main concern is represented by the
massive reserves of fossil fuels that would need to remain in the ground to avoid
dangerous interferences with the climate system, but which are currently in the fossil fuel
companies’ books.2 If the market value of these companies is readjusted belatedly and
suddenly, potentially dangerous feedback loops could emerge. That is, the initial shock
that climate policy would create by forcing the obsolescence of large fossil fuel assets
could trigger systemically-relevant second-round effects. Following its analysis, ESRB’s
policy recommendations included the mandatory disclosure of carbon intensity by some
firms as well as the inclusion of climate-related prudential risks in stress tests (leading to
“climate stress tests”) and other macroprudential strategies. Several other central banks
and institutes in charge of financial stability are currently considering similar
macroprudential policies, including in Canada, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden,
and the United Kingdom (Caldecott et al. 2016; Campiglio et al. 2017, 2018).
Although not yet mandatory, carbon disclosure has become increasingly common in
recent years among publicly-owned firms (Doda et al. 2016). To address investors’
concerns, as many as 600 companies have gone one step further and implemented an
internal carbon pricing scheme. Internal carbon prices tend to be relatively low but could

2

McGlade and Ekins (2015) estimate that about 80 percent of the current coal reserves should remain unused in order to
keep global temperatures within 2°C above pre-industrial levels. The same applies to 49 percent (33 percent) of global gas
(oil) reserves. McGlade and Ekins (2015) update the earlier analyses by Allen et al. (2009) and Meinshausen et al.
(2009).
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be easily ramped up, once the scheme is in place. Shadow carbon prices tend to be much
larger, sometimes in the order of $100 per ton of CO2 (CDP 2017; Gillingham et al.
2017). In terms of climate stress tests, Battiston et al. (2017) provide simulations for the
European financial system. The authors use a network approach to account for
interlinkages among financial institutions and examine the potential magnitude of
second-round effects. They confirm the initial concerns that an abrupt implementation of
climate policy could lead to a systemic risk, due to the important presence of carbonintensive sectors in investors’ portfolios. “High-carbon exposure” stocks (i.e. stocks of
fossil fuel companies) represent about 5 percent of pension funds’ assets, 4 percent of
insurances’, and 1 percent of banks’ (Weyzig et al. 2014). Adding other sectors relevant
for climate policy, as done in Battiston et al. (2017), can lead to much higher exposure, in
the 36-48 percent range. Furthermore, financial actors own the equity of other financial
actors in the order of 10-20 percent, implying substantial indirect exposure as well.
From a theoretical perspective, stranded assets could change the ranking of climate
policy instruments. According to standard economic theory, carbon pricing dominates the
ranking as the “first-best” instrument (Goulder and Parry 2008; Aldy and Stavins 2012).
However, political economy issues have limited its adoption (Oates and Portney 2003;
Carattini et al. 2018). A recent paper by Rozenberg et al. (2018) takes an Olsonian
perspective and compares, with a simple theoretical model, different climate policy
instruments in terms of stranded assets, which are considered visible losses of wealth
concentrated in a few vested interests. Consistently with eco- nomic intuition, carbon
pricing minimizes the (discounted) cost of climate policy. However, in the model, carbon
pricing leads to stranded assets. This is not the case for “second-best” mandates, feebates,
9

and standards, which in the model only affect new capital (e.g. new coal power plants,
new buildings). Hence, the authors identify a trade-off between cost-effectiveness and the
generation of stranded assets.3 At the same time, however, the fact that carbon pricing
leads to stranded assets can make climate policy more progressive (Rausch et al. 2010).
We complement the existing literature with a novel angle, looking at the most
prominent climate policy, the carbon tax, under different declinations, and how it impacts
firms with varying degrees of carbon exposure. By focusing on downstream firms, and
assessing heterogeneity along the carbon intensity dimension, we aim at capturing the full
extent of systemic risk. As shown in the literature, the exposure of financial firms
increases dramatically when sectors other than fossil fuel companies are taken into
account. Whether and to what extent substantial market fluctuations affect downstream
firms is crucial to understand the potential for systemic risk.
Washington Initiatives 732 and 1631
Carbon taxes have become increasingly common in recent years, especially
following the implementation of the Paris Agreement. Opposition from energy-intensive
groups and from citizens remain, however, major obstacles. The first examples of carbon
taxes date back to the early ’90s, when they were implemented in several Nordic
countries. These schemes are known for their generous exemptions to energy-intensive
industries. Switzerland implemented a carbon tax in 2008, but one covering only heating
fuels (Conway et al. 2017; Narassimhan et al. 2017). More ambitious designs were
rejected on the ballot first in 2000 and then again in 2015. Also in 2008, British Columbia

3

Following Goulder and Schein (2013), a carbon tax with carefully designed exemptions may limit the extent of
stranded assets, similarly to emissions trading schemes with some grandfathering (Goulder et al. 2010). Trade-offs,
however, remain.
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implemented a revenue-neutral carbon tax (Murray and Rivers 2015). More than 20
distinct carbon tax schemes currently exist around the world, to which one can add
similar schemes such as the carbon floor and the climate change levy in the United
Kingdom (World Bank 2019). None of these schemes was implemented following a
public vote.
I-732 was designed as follows.4 The tax would have started, in 2016, with a tax rate
of $15 per ton of CO2, which would have increased in 2018 to $25 per ton of CO2. The
tax rate would have kept increasing gradually by 3.5 percent per year (plus inflation),
until reaching the target of $100 per ton of CO2 (in constant 2016 dollars). Fossil fuels
from all sources would have been taxed upstream, including imports from other states
used for electricity generation for the Washington market. I-732 was designed as a
revenue-neutral reform, with the objective to appeal to an electorate of moderate
Republican voters. Revenue neutrality would have been achieved, in theory, as follows.
The state’s sales tax would have been reduced from 6.5 percent to 5.5 percent. By
reducing a regressive tax such as the sales tax, Carbon Washington planned to address, if
partially, concerns related with the distributional effects of carbon taxes. To address the
same concerns, some of the revenues would have been used to match the Federal Earning
Income Tax Credit at 25 percent. Finally, local businesses would have benefitted from the
elimination of the state’s business and occupation tax for manufacturers (as high as 0.48
percent). In Washington state, the minimum number of valid signatures for an initiative to
be successful is slightly above 250,000. The state legislature declined the opportunity to
pass I-732 directly, or to suggest an alternative to voters, so that the initiative ended up on

4

Please refer to Anderson et al. (2019), on which we largely rely as well, for a thorough analysis of I-732 (and I-1631).
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the 2016 ballot. I-732 was on the ballot on November 8, 2016 and rejected at 59 percent.
Following the rejection of I-732, I-1631 was announced in March 2018. Its design
was as follows. The initial tax rate was set at $15 per ton of CO2, same as I-732, with
implementation in 2020. The tax escalator implied an increase by $2 per ton of CO2 per
year, until reaching statewide emissions goals. The carbon tax was not designed to be
revenue neutral. Rather, revenues would have been earmarked to promote several goals,
through three funds. First, a fund for clean air and clean energy. Second, a fund
promoting water quality and forest health. Third, a fund for community-related
investments. The policy was labeled “fee”, in line with Washington state’s laws. I-1631
was on the ballot on November 6, 2018. The initiative was rejected at 57 percent.
I-723 and I-1631 have similar designs, in that they start with a relatively low tax
rate, includes a tax escalator, and cover most CO2 in the economy, upstream. As stressed,
the most notable difference relates to the use of revenues. I-732 was designed as revenue
neutral, I-1631 as a Green New Deal type of policy. The difference in design also
mattered for part of the electorate, although how voters might have split was relatively
hard to predict beforehand (see section 3.4). Supporters of I- 732 included proponents of
carbon taxation such as the Citizens’ Climate Lobby, Audubon Washington, and minor
environmental groups. Local Democratic party chapters and the renewable industry also
supported it. Local chambers of commerce and carbon-intensive industries opposed it,
but so did also progressive organizations such as labor and social justice groups, the most
influential environmental groups (an alliance including the Sierra Club), and the State
Democratic party. The split among environmentalists ultimately contributed to its
rejection. Supporters of I-1631 included many environmental groups and was
12

championed by those that opposed I-732. Opponents included business associations and
carbon-intensive industries. For I-732, the yes-camp spent about $3 million, against $1.4
million spent by the no-camp. For I-1631, the yes-camp spent about $15 million, with $1
million each contributed by billionaires Bloomberg and Gates. The no-camp spent $32
million. Overall, the campaign spending for I-1631 was a record in the state’s history,
according to local media.
Data and empirical strategy
In this section, we describe our data and empirical strategy. We start by detailing the
measure capturing the effects of an event on the stock market, namely cumulative
abnormal returns (CARs). Second, we explain our estimation strategy and how we
identify such event effects by controlling for confounding countrywide effects. Third, we
describe our control set along with the underlying data sources and provide descriptive
statistics. Finally, we discuss the events to be analyzed in relation to our identification
strategy.
Cumulative abnormal returns
We use a standard short-run event study methodology to estimate the abnormal
returns associated with a given event. We estimate the normal market performance
by using three standard approaches, which are compared for sensitivity purposes (see
Campbell et al. 1997). These are the market model, the Capital Asset Pricing Model
(CAPM), and the Fama-French three-factors model (FFM).
The market model is given by rit = βirmt + Eit, where rit is the return of asset
i at the trading date t, rmt represents returns to a market price index m, and Eit is an error
13

term. The normal return is the predicted return given by rˆit = βˆirmt. We denote the
event date with T, and specify the event window as a time period around the event date
from T0 < T to T1 > T. To control for potential feedback from the event to the normal
market performance, we use an estimation window prior to the event window ending at
T0 − 1.
We define the relative time index τ = t − T to measure the distance to the event date.
Then, the abnormal returns are estimated by the difference between realized returns and
normal returns, given by the prediction errors ART +τ = rT +τ −rˆT +τ. The effect of the
event is generally parametrized by cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), which are given
by the sum of abnormal returns (ARs) over a number of consecutive days in the event
window.
In the CAPM estimations, the returns are calculated in excess of a risk-free rate of
return. Formally, the CAPM is given by r˜it = βir˜mt + Eit, where r˜it = rit − rft, r˜mt =
rmt −rft, and rft is a risk-free rate of return. The Fama-French model augments the
CAPM with size (st) and value risk factors (vt) as additional covariates, such that r˜it =
βir˜mt + λsist + λvivt + Eit.
Our sample consists of all firms in the 2018 Russell 3000 constituent list. We obtain
their daily stock prices and the Russell 3000 price index from Thomson Reuters
Datastream and calculate continuously compounded returns. As per standard procedure,
we use one-month Treasury-bill rates as a proxy for the risk-free rate of return.5

5

The data on the risk-free asset and the Fama and French (1993) factors are retrieved from
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html (last accessed, May 12, 2019).
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Figure 1: Abnormal returns around the ballot dates

Note: This figure illustrates the median, and upper and lower 25th percentiles of CAPMadjusted ARs. ARs are truncated at upper and lower fifth percentiles. The horizontal axis
indicates the relative distance to the events in terms of trading dates, such that date zero
stands for the event date.
In our baseline setting, we estimate the normal market performance by using a
window length of 60 trading days ending at 10 days before the event date. Hence, our
estimation window covers a sample between dates τ = −71 and τ = −11.6
Figure 1 illustrates the median, and upper and lower 25th percentiles of ARs
from the CAPM estimations for all companies in the Russell 3000 constituency list,
regardless of their location, around the dates when I-732 and I-1631 were on the ballot in
Washington state. We exclude upper and lower fifth percentiles. In the figures, the
horizontal axis indicates the relative distance to the event in terms of trading dates, such
that date zero stands for the event date. The distribution of ARs in the pre-event windows

6

Our results are robust to alternative estimation windows, including 90 or 150 trading days or leaving a 20-day gap
between the estimation window and the event date. All additional estimations are available by the authors upon request.
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are similar for both events and quite stable. The increase in the spread of ARs following
the 2016 ballots is quite intuitive given the surprise election of Donald Trump on this date
(see Wagner et al. 2018). On the other hand, the 2018 midterm elections do not seem to
have had a major effect, on average. This result is in line with the common view that
midterm election results tend to be less surprising. Incumbent presidents generally tend to
lose seats in the first midterm, which also occurred in the 2018 election. In the next
subsection, we explain how we control for nationwide confounding events to establish
causality.
Estimation strategy
We are interested in identifying the effect of a series of events that are expected to
affect firms active in Washington state. A potential threat to identification is the presence
of nationwide contemporaneous shocks, which could act as confounders. In this section,
we describe our estimation strategy, which explicitly accounts for such potential
confounders by using a counterfactual comparison group represented by nonWashington-based firms.
Our empirical approach is as follows. Let the dummy variable Di = {0, 1} stands
for the treatment status. In our application, it takes value one for Washington-based firms
and zero otherwise, which represents a conservative approach. Using the potential
outcome framework, let CAR1i denote the CAR of firm i on a single event date if it were
a Washington-based firm, and by CAR0i if it were a non-Washington- based firm. We are
interested in estimating the causal effect of the treatment on CARs given by
ρ = E[CAR1i|Di = 1, Xi] − E[CAR0i|Di = 1, Xi],
16

which is the average treatment effect on the treated (ATET). Here, Xi is a vector of
covariates, which we describe in the following subsection. The fundamental identification
problem is that the second term is unobserved, as the CAR of a Washington-based firm
(Di = 1) in the case it was based elsewhere is never observed (CAR0i). Consider the
following specification to estimate the effect of a single event on the CARs:
CARi = α + ρDi + Xitγ + ηi,
where α is a constant, ηi is the error term, and γ is a vector of parameters. If the error term
and Di are uncorrelated conditional on the covariate set, then ρ captures the ATET, that is,
the causal effect of being subject to the treatment on the outcome variable CAR. The
uncorrelatedness assumption can be stated as E[CAR0i|Di = 1, Xi] = E[CAR0i|Di = 0, Xi],
which means that, conditional on Xi, the potential CAR when firm i were not in
Washington (CAR0i) is independent of whether it is actually based in Washington state or
not. Then, the observed difference between a control and a treatment unit, conditional on
their observed characteristics X, reflects the event effect.
Our outcome variable is the estimated CARs. In the absence of any event on this
date, the CARs should be equal to zero for both the control and treatment groups, as
given by market efficiency. Further, in the absence of nationwide shocks, we could
simply analyze the CARs of Washington-based firms. In presence of potential nationwide
shocks, we can account for their effect by comparing treatment and control groups.
Hence, the identification strategy relies on the ability of the covariate set to capture the
effects of potential nationwide shocks.
An empirical strategy consistent with this conceptual approach is a matching
estimation. A matching estimand constructs a counterfactual unit that best mimics the
17

observed characteristics of a treated unit, such that a control unit is assigned a larger
weight if it is closer to the treatment unit in terms of its observed characteristics. The
advantage of a matching strategy is that it maximizes balance across compared units in
terms of their observed characteristics, such as size and leverage. We estimate the weights
by using the propensity score matching (PSM) algorithm. The propensity score represents
the probability of receiving the treatment as predicted by observable characteristics (X).
We estimate these scores by using a logit regression of treatment status on various
covariate sets. We present our test results on the balance of covariates and overlap
assumption in the Appendix together with the results from additional, standard estimators
for treatment effects.
Covariate set
Our control set includes a rich set of characteristics describing companies in the
Russell 3000 index, based on the 2018 list of constituents. All firm characteristics are
obtained from Thomson Reuters. For all variables, we use the latest available accounting
data prior to an event date. Table 1 presents a set of descriptive statistics with 2017 values
for the variables in our baseline control set. We employ standard firm characteristics such
as profitability, leverage ratio, market capitalization, and sales growth. We augment this
set with additional variables that can further account for potential confounding events. I732 was on the ballot on November 8, 2016, which was marked with Donald Trump’s
surprise election. It is reasonable to expect this surprise election to have nationwide
effects on the stock market. For instance, Wagner et al. (2018) find that the victory of the
Republican candidate in the 2016 election increased the stock value of firms with a
stronger global orientation and a higher tax burden. In a conservative approach, we
augment the standard control set by adding variables such as corporate income tax rate
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and foreign sales ratio.7
Table 1: Control set: descriptive statistics for 2017
Leverage ratio (%)
Profitability (%)
Annual net sales growth (%)
Market cap ($ bil.)
Tax rate (5-year average) (%)
Foreign sales ratio (%)
Emissions (tons of CO2-e)

N
Mean Median
2741 26.51
24.05
2883
0.17
2.37
2819 11.34
7.68
2894 10.57
1.79
2575 23.46
26.51
2949 18.67
0.00
2341 1238.30 37.66

Carbon intensity:
Emissions to net sales (tons of CO2-e/$)
Emissions to physical assets (tons CO2-e/$)

2328
2280

233.39
873.55

St. Dev.
20.86
16.70
25.55
41.97
12.84
26.68
8843.15

Min.
Max.
0.02
106.69
-94.49
34.73
-120.79
195.08
0.01
867.51
0.00
65.93
0.00
100.00
0.08
294950.38

25.63 2064.55 0.01
133.46 16859.83 0.17

93754.09
782361.75

Note: This table presents descriptive statistics for our main control variables. Leverage is
the ratio of total debt to total assets. Profitability is the ratio of pre-tax corporate income
to total assets. Tax rate is the 5-year averaged ratio of corporate income tax to pre-tax
income. Foreign sales ratio is the percentage of foreign sales over total sales. In the
calculation of carbon intensity, physical assets consist of the value of plants, properties,
and equipment.
Given that the tax burden of a carbon tax is proportional to a company’s emissions,
measured as CO2 equivalent (or CO2-e), we expect both I-732 and I-1631 to have
heterogeneous effects depending on how carbon intensive a firm is. In particular, we
consider the following two ratios as measures of carbon intensity: emissions to net sales
and emissions to physical assets. Firm-level CO2 emissions are retrieved from the
Thomson Reuters ESG Carbon database, which relies on self-reported emissions and
imputes missing data based on past emissions, firm size, energy consumption, and
industry characteristics. Another dataset measuring CO2 emissions, which is commonly
employed in the literature, comes from the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) database. In
our sample of firms, the correlation between our measure of emissions and scope 1
emissions reported in the CDP database is virtually perfect for 2015.

7

Our results are robust to using cash-effective tax rates rather than corporate income tax rates.
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Measurement of events and further considerations for identification
The main focus of our empirical analyses is the outcome of the vote on I-732, on
November 8, 2016, and I-1631, on November 6, 2018. While both initiatives were
eventually rejected, prior to the ballot day they were both heading in the opinion polls.
Hence, the markets can be expected to have readjusted following the release of the actual
outcome. Table 2 presents a summary of the opinion polls, which were realized by
different organizations in the approach to the ballots. For I-732, the most recent opinion
poll indicated 42 percent yes-votes against 37 percent no-votes. According to the online
political encyclopedia Ballotpedia.org, in the final two weeks prior to the ballots, more
than $1 million was spent by the opposition camp, most likely trying to counteract the
consistent support observed in the opinion polls. For I-1631, the level of support in the
polls was even high enough to exceed the 50 percent cutoff. In this case, recall that the
opposition spent about $32 million.
Table 2: Poll Results
Poll
Elway
KOMO News/Strategies 360
Elway
YouGov
Crosscut/Elway

Initiative
I-732
I-732
I-732
I-732
I-1631

Date
Aug. 2016
Sep.-Oct. 2016
Oct. 2016
Oct. 2016
Oct. 2018

Yes (%)
34
42
40
51
50

No (%) Undecided (%) Sample
37
30
500
37
21
500
32
28
502
44
5
750
36
14
400

Note: The source for all polls is Ballotpedia.org. Margin of error across the polls varies
between +/- 4.4 and +/- 5.0.
Further, we consider natural that investors were made aware of the initiatives’
outcomes on the ballot day or a few days after. While two emissions trading schemes are
operational in California and in the Northeast, no carbon tax exists to date in the United
States. If any of these initiatives had passed, it would have been the first carbon tax to be
ever implemented statewide. Hence, there was considerable public interest around these
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initiatives. While considerable public interest is not a necessary element for investors to
be informed about political events, it makes it even more plausible that the ballot
outcomes rapidly became public knowledge. Illustrating this point, Figure 2 presents the
search popularity of three related terms on Google: “carbon tax”, “Initiative 732,” and
“Initiative 1631.” As standard with Google search data, as provided by Google Trends,
the maximum score during a given period is normalized at 100. Both the search term
“Initiative 732” and the term “Initiative 1631” attain the maximum popularity score
around the respective ballots. The search terms “Initiative 732” and “Initiative 1631” can
partially reflect local interest. On the other hand, the popularity of the term “carbon tax”
is more likely to be driven by countrywide interest. The term “carbon tax” attains its
maximum popularity in February 2016 when the Supreme Court blocked the enforcement
of the Clean Power Plan (CPP). This decision had a global importance, as the CCP was
the Obama administration’s major policy to curb CO2 emissions. Relative to this score,
the search popularity of the three terms around the relevant ballot dates is substantial.
Figure 2: Google Trends outcomes for “carbon tax”, “Initiative 732”, and “Initiative
1631”, between 2015 and 2019

Note: This figure presents the weekly search popularity on Google of the following three
terms: "carbon tax", "Initiative 732," "Initiative 1631." All series come from Google
Trends. All the illustrated scores are relative to the maximum, set by Google at 100.
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Both in 2016 and 2018, there were other state initiatives on the ballot together with
I-732 and I-1631. We discuss these initiatives in detail in Appendix A. In short, we are
not concerned about these other initiatives acting as confounders for the following three
reasons. First, some of them are largely irrelevant for the stock market, as only a small
fraction of the economy is affected by either approval or rejection. Second, by the ballot
date, the outcome of most of them was clearly predictable, with polls suggesting a clear
outcome and the ballot results matching the polls’ forecast very well. Third, none of the
initiatives on the ballot relate directly to the carbon intensity of firms in the way that
initiatives I-732 and I-1631 do. If the ATETs that we find in the main analyses were
driven only by these confounders, then we should not find any heterogeneity along the
carbon-intensity dimension.
In the next section, we show empirically that the rejection of the carbon tax
initiatives led to positive and significant reactions in the stock market. This result implies
that the stock markets had already (partially) priced in the effects of a potential approval.
In order to validate this intuition, we further analyze the stock market reactions to the
dates on which the initiatives were submitted and approved officially.
Results
In this section, we present our main results. We start by presenting average effects of
the initiatives’ ballot rejections on Washington-based firms. Next, we present our analysis
on heterogeneity in the ATETs. Finally, we present a set of complementary findings
leveraging the announcement dates for both initiatives.
Average effects of the ballot results on the valuation of Washington-based firms
This section presents our main results concerning the average effects of ballot results
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for I-732 and I-1631 on the stock performance of Washington-based firms. Table 3
presents the results from our OLS and PSM estimations. The dependent variables are
either the CAPM or Fama-French Model (FFM) adjusted 10-day CARs calculated from a
window starting with the next date following the event. Using CARs based on the market
model and using CAPM-adjusted CARs yields similar results. We present the
corresponding results from using CARs based on the market model in Appendix B.
Table 3 shows that the estimated effect of I-1631’s rejection is positive and
significant. This result is robust to employing different control sets, using CAPM- or
FFM-adjusted CARs, and using OLS or PSM. For I-732, using OLS or PSM and using
different control sets do not lead to drastic differences in the estimated effects. However,
the estimations based on FFM-adjusted CARs yield systematically higher estimates
compared to those based on CAPM-adjusted CARs. Hence, it seems that controlling for
Fama-French risk factors is important to account for the role of confounders and the
important noise surrounding the rejection of I-732. Given the predictive power of FamaFrench risk factors and the insensitivity of our estimates to OLS or PSM, we present the
results from OLS estimations with FFM-adjusted CARs in the rest of the main text. We
provide the corresponding results from using CAPM- adjusted CARs, as well as PSM for
all models, in Appendices B and C, respectively. In the rest of the paper, we use the full
specification, which includes industry-specific fixed effects and our covariate set, as our
preferred specification.
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Table 3: Average event effects on Washington-based firms

CAPM - OLS

(1)
0.076
(0.974)

Initiative 732
(2)
0.731
(0.995)

(3)
0.175
(0.910)

(4)
2.013∗∗
(0.812)

Initiative 1631
(5)
(6)
2.326∗∗
2.072∗
(1.112)
(1.061)

Treatment
Observations
CAPM - PSM

41
2511
0.067
(0.876)

32
1959
1.455
(1.168)

32
1959
-0.278
(1.045)

42
2658
2.011∗∗
(0.803)

29
2134
1.807
(1.156)

29
2134
1.984∗∗
(0.794)

Treatment
Observations
FF - OLS

41
2384
1.950∗∗
(0.980)

32
1959
2.800∗∗∗
(0.975)

32
1667
2.133∗
∗
(0.965)

42
2526
2.171∗∗∗
(0.789)

29
2133
2.285∗∗
(1.102)

29
2027
2.082∗∗
(1.053)

Treatment
Observations
FF - PSM

44
2517
1.945∗∗
(0.963)

31
1962
3.294∗∗∗
(0.850)

31
1962
2.395∗
∗
(1.006)

42
2659
2.168∗∗∗
(0.781)

29
2136
1.598
(1.201)

29
2136
1.988∗∗
(0.844)

Treatment
Observations
Industry fixed effects
Covariate set

44
2406
Yes
No

31
1962
No
Yes

31
1534
Yes
Yes

42
2526
Yes
No

29
2135
No
Yes

29
2027
Yes
Yes

Note: This table presents the OLS and PSM estimates of ATET where the dependent
variables are CAPM-adjusted or Fama-French (FF) adjusted 10-days CARs from date 1
to 9. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. The covariate set includes profitability
ratio, leverage ratio, annual sales growth, market cap, 5-year corporate income tax rate,
foreign sales ratio. Industry-specific fixed effects are based on ICB 1-digit industry
classification (the Industry Classification Benchmark by FTSE International).
Significance levels are indicated as ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
In Figure 3, we display graphically, for both ballot dates, the estimated ATETs from
OLS regressions based on FFM-adjusted CARs, along with 95 percent confidence
intervals. Here, we conduct in-time placebo tests around the event dates, which provide
further insights to the stock market movements around the ballot dates. In these graphs,
the horizontal axis measures the relative distance in time to the event date, in terms of
trading days. For each date τ, we repeat our estimations by using 10-day CARs,
calculated as the sum of ARs from date τ to τ +9. Hence, the ATETs on date 1 correspond
to those presented in Table 3. As the events of interest are the announcement of the ballot
results, we assume no informational leakage in the pre-event window. So, in the absence
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of other events of relevance, we expect the ATETs prior to the event dates to be generally
insignificant, which serves as placebo test for our model’s performance. Note, however,
that the placebo ATETs can gradually move towards the event effect in the pre-event
window, as the 10-days CARs that are closer to the event date pick more ARs from the
post-event window. In Figure 3, the ATETs in the placebo windows are stable and
virtually always insignificant. Hence, Figure 3 confirms the ability of our model in
predicting the normal market performance and establishing a balanced control group. In
line with Table 3, the ATETs are significant in date 1. ATETs, actually, remain significant
up to date 4, indicating that while the market reactions started immediately, the
adjustment process did take a few days to complete. Eventually, the market consumes all
arbitrage opportunities, and the ATETs become insignificant again after date 4.
Figure 3: ATETs over the event window with FFM-adjusted CARs

Note: This figure presents the average effects of ballot results for I-732 and I-1631 on
Washington- based firms, together with in-time placebo tests. The event day (date 0) is
denoted by the vertical dashed line. The days prior to the event window are used as
placebo-event days. The estimation window is given by the 60-day period prior to the
pseudo window. The 95 percent confidence intervals, based on robust standard errors, are
denoted by the capped vertical lines.
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The estimation results in Figure 3 show that the effect of I-1631 tends to be much
larger than that of I-732. Observing some difference between I-732 and I-1631 is in line
with the initiatives’ different designs. Since I-732 was designed as revenue neutral, and
its revenues would have been used, mainly, to reduce sales taxes, such a design could
have partially alleviated the burden of a carbon tax. On the other hand, I-1631 was not
designed as a revenue-neutral reform. Most revenues would have been earmarked for
environmental purposes, benefitting a relatively small group of firms active in the green
economy but leading to higher net costs for virtually all other firms. These results seem to
indicate that investors may pay attention to the design of policies in evaluating their
effects on firms’ profitability. We provide further evidence on this aspect in the following
section.8
Both Table 3 and Figure 3 show substantial reactions to the rejection of the carbon
tax initiatives. On average over the entire sample, the estimated effect is as high as 3
percent. It follows that the stock market had already priced in, at least to some extent, the
possibility of a positive outcome in both 2016 and 2018. Consequently, the realization of
an uncertain outcome required a market adjustment, which in this case affected the
performance of Washington-based firms positively. Given our conservative approach and
the limited jurisdiction and ambition of the policy proposals that we investigate, our first
set of results already point to a potential for large readjustments in the stock market value
of a broad range of firms in the case of a more abrupt increase in carbon prices. To fully
gauge the extent that the market reacted to our events, and assess the potential for
systemic risk, we analyze in the following section heterogeneous treatment effects along

8

In both this section and the following, we use the Hausman (1978) specification test with robust variance-covariance
matrices to test the difference in estimates between I-1631 and I-732. While we determine that these differences are not
sufficiently large to reach statistical significance with the full sample, they are statistically significant and economically
very meaningful for high carbon-intensity firms (see Figure 6). This is consistent with the main finding in the next
section, which is that average treatment effects for both initiatives are mainly driven by high carbon-intensity firms.
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the carbon intensity dimension.
Note that our empirical approach is robust to a set of sensitivity tests, which are
presented in the Appendix. In particular, in Appendix B we conduct our analysis by using
CARs from the market model and the CAPM. Next, we present the results from various
alternative estimators, such as doubly robust regressions (DRR), in Appendix C. In the
same Appendix section, we also describe in detail the results from PSM estimations. For
both DRR and PSM, we also show that the propensity scores and the individual
covariates are balanced across treatment levels. Further, in Appendix D, we conduct inspace placebo tests by assuming false treatment groups. Specifically, we assume in turn
that a state other than Washington is treated and estimate in-space placebo ATETs. These
in-space placebo tests rely on non-parametric permutation tests, which do not require
imposing any distributional assumption on the error term (MacKinnon and Webb 2019).
In the same way, we also realize placebo tests by randomly assigning the treatment
among all firms in the Russell 3000 index, regardless of their location. Results from this
exercise are also presented in Appendix D. In this Appendix section, we show that our
results are robust also to non-parametric inference. Such an approach is used in the
literature also to pacify concerns about generated dependent variables, small-sample
issues, cross-sectional correlation due to clustered assignment, and the absence of random
assignment. In the following sections, we provide further insights into our results by
analyzing heterogeneity along the carbon intensity dimension and by examining stock
market reactions to the announcement of both initiatives.
Heterogeneity in stock market reactions
In this section, we investigate heterogeneity around the event effects. An obvious
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dimension on which to analyze stock market adjustments following the rejection of a
carbon tax is carbon intensity. We follow the standard split-sample approach, so that we
repeat our estimations by splitting the treatment and control groups into two sub-samples
at the median carbon intensity of the treatment group.
The results for I-732 are illustrated in Figure 4. Here, we calculate the carbon
intensity of firms by normalizing the carbon emissions variable with net sales. The
emissions-to-sales ratio is particularly interesting for I-732, as this policy would have
redistributed carbon-tax revenues by reducing the sales tax. In line with economic
intuition, Figure 4 suggests that the effect of I-732’s rejection, as detailed above, is
mainly driven by the adjustments on the stock value of high-intensity firms.
Figure 4: Heterogeneity in the ATETs of I-732 over the event window along the
carbon intensity dimension with FFM-adjusted CARs

Note: This figure presents the average effect of ballot result for I-732 on above and below
median carbon intensity firms in Washington state, together with in-time placebo tests.
The event day (date 0) is denoted by the dashed vertical line. The days prior to the event
window are used as placebo- event days. The estimation window is given by the 60-day
period prior to the pseudo window. The 95 percent confidence intervals, based on robust
standard errors, are denoted by the capped vertical lines.
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The effect of I-732 on high-intensity firms is considerably larger than that on lowintensity firms. We now turn to I-1631. For this initiative, we investigate heterogeneity by
normalizing emissions with the value of tangible assets such as plants, properties, and
equipment. The results, presented in Figure 5, are consistent with Figure 4. Indeed,
Figure 5 shows that, also for I-1631’s rejection, the stock market adjustments are mainly
driven by high-intensity firms.9
Figure 5: Heterogeneity in the ATETs of I-1631 over the event window with FFMadjusted CARs

Note: This figure presents the average effect of ballot result for I-1631 on above and
below median carbon intensity firms in Washington state, together with in-time placebo
tests. The event day (date 0) is denoted by the dashed vertical line. The days prior to the
event window are used as placebo- event days. The estimation window is given by the
60-day period prior to the pseudo window. The 95 percent confidence intervals, based on
robust standard errors, are denoted by the capped vertical lines.
The results in Figure 5 show that the estimated average effect of I-1631 in the high
carbon intensity sample tends to be as high as 5 percent. This estimate needs to be put
9

Our findings are robust to alternative specifications of the carbon intensity ratio. Using sales as denominator leads to
only slightly lower (higher) estimates for high-intensity (low-intensity) firms for I-1631. Using physical capital as
denominator leads to a somewhat smaller difference between high- and low-intensity firms for I-732.
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into perspective. First, it refers to an average over 50 percent of the universe of
Washington-based firms, namely what we define as carbon-intensive firms. Second, it is
the result of a very conservative approach, in the way the treatment is attributed. Third, it
follows from the rejection of a proposal for which the odds of a defeat were not at 0
percent, despite the overall surprise with respect to the opinion polls. Fourth, both I-732
and I-1631 are policies with moderate ambition and limited jurisdiction. In this light, our
results, which already suggest substantial readjustments in the value of 50 percent of the
traded stocks, need to be interpreted as a lower bound for a potential national policy, or a
regional policy with higher ambition.
Figure 6: Differences between the ATETs of I-732 and I-1631 over the event window
for high carbon intensity firms with FFM-adjusted CARs

Note: This figure presents the differences between the average effects of ballot results for
I-732 and I-1631 on Washington-based firms with above median carbon intensity. The
event day (date 0) is denoted by the vertical dashed line. The days prior to the event
window are used as placebo-event days. The estimation window is given by the 60-day
period prior to the pseudo window. The 90 percent confidence intervals, based on robust
standard errors, are denoted by the capped vertical lines.
Revenue neutrality, however, may mitigate, if partially, the potential for systemic
risk. In Figure 5, the estimated effects for high-intensity firms are considerably larger
compared to I-732. We provide statistical tests on these differences in Figure 6, where we
test the null of zero difference between the ATETs of each initiative, by using the
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standard specification test by Hausman (1978) with robust variance-covariance matrices.
The results show that the estimated effect of I-1631 on high-intensity firms is
significantly higher than that of I-732. These results are consistent with the different
designs between the two carbon tax initiatives.
Stock market reactions on the path to the ballots
The positive stock market reactions that we observe following the rejection of both
initiatives on the respective ballot days and shortly after both suggest that investors had
already priced in, if only partially, the potential implications of a successful vote. In order
to validate this intuition, we further investigate the reactions to the announcements of
both initiatives. With respect to ballot days, announcements have one advantage. Since
ballots take place on the same day of major elections, the presence of noise may make
precise estimation of the ATETs harder to achieve. Such issue may not be present for
announcements. However, with respect to ballot days, announcements also have
disadvantages. Information about the plans to launch a new initiative may already
circulate before its formal announcement. Hence, the adjustments that one may observe
following a formal announcement may mainly capture the effect of investors readjusting
their beliefs and upgrading carbon tax proposals from rumors to actual initiatives with
potential to become policy. Further, announcements represent only the first of several
steps before an initiative reaches the ballot box.
We start with the early days of I-732. On March 11, 2015, stand-up economist Yoram
Bauman formally submitted the initiative to Washington’s Secretary of State. The results
for this date are presented in Figure 7. First, the estimated ATETs are negative for highintensity firms and positive for low-intensity firms. The size of these reactions is
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comparable in absolute terms. As a result, the average reaction is close to zero. This
pattern is similar, albeit not entirely symmetric, to what observed in Figure 4 for the
ballot day. Note that the information set available to investors is different across the two
dates. First, media coverage was relatively limited around the submission date. Second,
the arguments of the opposition campaign may be absent, or less salient, at the time of the
announcement. Hence, at the time of the announcement, investors might have rewarded
low-intensity firms. Recall that I-732 was designed on the model of British Columbia’s
carbon tax. Empirical evidence has been circulating for some time suggesting that the
British Columbia revenue-neutral carbon tax might have led to employment losses in
energy-intensive firms, but employment gains in clean firms, especially small firms
active in the local service sector (Azevedo et al. 2017; Yamazaki 2017). These findings
have been considered evidence in favor of the “job-shifting hypothesis” of revenueneutral carbon taxes, with which the evidence in Figure 7 is consistent. In this light, the
more subdued effects on the ballot day may reflect a more conservative approach by
investors, whose beliefs might have been influenced, over the course of about two years,
by both campaigns as well as other stakeholders.
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Figure 7: ATETs over the event window for submission of I-732 with FFM-adjusted
CARs

Note: This figure presents the average effect of I-732’s submission on all Washingtonbased firms, as well as above and below median carbon intensity firms in Washington,
together with in-time placebo tests. The event day (date 0) is indicated with the dashed
line. The days prior to the event window are the placebo-event days. The estimation
window is the 60 days just prior to the pseudo window. The 95 percent confidence
intervals, based on robust standard errors, are indicated with capped-vertical lines.
We now turn to the early days of I-1631. As before, we start with the formal
announcement, which took place on March 2, 2018. However, this announcement took
place, intentionally, on the same date that Senate Bill 6203 (SB-6203), a carbon tax
proposal championed by Governor Jay Inslee, failed to gather sufficient support among
state legislators. The design of SB-6203 and I-1631 are similar, and these two
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overlapping events are linked. Immediately after the rejection of SB-6203, proponents of
a carbon tax with earmarked revenues switched to the initiative toolbox to promote their
policy design.
Figure 8 presents the estimation results for this date. The estimated reactions are
very similar to those observed in Figure 5 following the rejection of I-1631: a positive
market reaction driven mainly by high carbon-intensity firms. Hence, we may assume
that the rejection of SB-6203, a carbon tax proposal that could have immediately become
policy, dominated the effect of I-1631’s announcement.
Figure 8: ATETs over the event window for submission of I-1631 (and rejection of
SB 6203) with FFM-adjusted CARs
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Note: This figure presents the average effect of SB-6203’s rejection on all Washingtonbased firms, as well as above and below median carbon intensity firms in Washington,
together with in-time placebo tests. The event day (date 0) is indicated with the dashed
line. The days prior to the event window are the placebo-event days. The estimation
window is the 60 days just prior to the pseudo window. The 95 percent confidence
intervals, based on robust standard errors, are indicated with capped-vertical lines.
Figure 9: ATETs over the event window for the clearance for circulation of I-1631
with FFM-adjusted CARs

Note: This figure presents the average effect of I-1631’s clearance for circulation on all
Washington- based firms, as well as above and below median carbon intensity firms in
the state, together with in-time placebo tests. The event day (date 0) is denoted by the
dashed vertical line. The days prior to the event window are used as placebo-event days.
The estimation window is given by the 60-day period prior to the pseudo window. The 95
percent confidence intervals, based on robust standard errors, are denoted by the capped
vertical lines.
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About two weeks after the submission date, on March 20, 2018, I-1631 was cleared
for circulation by the state’s Secretary of State. Figure 9 illustrates the results for the
clearance date. Figure 9 shows that when I-1631 received formal clearance, the stock
market reacted negatively, on average. Again, this reaction was driven mainly by highintensity stocks. Note that, given the short time window between formal submission and
formal clearance, the significant ATETs in the pre-event window are related to the rejection
of SB-6203. The pattern that we observe for the date of clearance mirrors the effects found
for the ballot date, when I-1631 was ultimately rejected. The fact that the market reacted
when I-1631 received clearance also supports the idea that before the ballot date the market
had partly priced in a potential success on the ballot.
Conclusions
About 20 percent of global greenhouse gas emissions are subject to carbon pricing.
Many jurisdictions are considering implementing a carbon price while others are
constantly increasing the stringency of their carbon pricing schemes. Following the Paris
Agreement, a first acceleration in the implementation of carbon pricing schemes has been
observed. A further acceleration may follow over the next few years, as countries are
expected to ratchet up their climate goals, or Nationally Determined Contributions.
Slowly but steadily, the world is moving forward towards a state in which coverage of
greenhouse gas emissions by carbon pricing is much higher. Consistently, economists are
increasingly vocal about the prospects of harmonizing carbon prices with the ultimate
goal of achieving a global carbon price (Weitzman 2014; Stiglitz et al. 2017; Carattini et
al. 2019).
A sudden convergence towards relatively high carbon prices, while justified from a
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climate perspective, may pose a threat to the stability of the financial system. As a result,
central bankers have expressed deep concerns about the risk of financial contagion,
driven by climate policy. Carbon pricing could lead investors to reevaluate a broad range
of assets, of which many could become “stranded.” Given the considerable exposure of
financial actors to carbon-intensive firms, beyond fossil fuel industries, and the strong
interlinkages among such actors, there is high potential for a systemic risk. While central
banks and other institutions in charge of financial stability have been investing important
resources to refine their models of systemic risk and consider climate stress tests in their
portfolio of macroprudential strategies, there is a need for empirical analyses, measuring
whether and by how much investors reevaluate the value of stocks following a change in
the probability of carbon pricing being implemented.
In this paper, we analyze the unique case of Washington state, where two carbon tax
proposals were brought, two years apart, to the ballot box by two bottom-up initiatives.
Furthermore, we leverage the different designs of these carbon tax proposals. I-732,
rejected on the ballot in 2016, was designed as revenue neutral, with carbon tax revenues
being compensated by lower sales taxes. I-1631, rejected in 2018, would have expanded
the government’s budget. In particular, the carbon tax revenues would have been
earmarked for environmental and social purposes.
We analyze the stock performance of Washington-based firms against their
counterfactual scenarios and find important swings in the value of Washington-based
firms following investors’ reassessment of the risks of a carbon price being implemented
in the state. We identify significant reactions for both initiatives, suggesting that, if
accepted, they would have led to a significant loss of market value for Washington-based
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firms. Consistent with its revenue-neutral design, we observe relatively smaller effects
for I-732. Further, in both cases we observe important heterogeneity along the carbonintensity dimension.
Hence, our findings support central banks’ calls for macroprudential policies to
anticipate the implementation of carbon pricing, which remains the most cost-effective
policy even in the presence of stranded assets. While our results do not provide a direct
test for the effectiveness of such macroprudential policies, they suggest that even a
moderate carbon tax, with limited jurisdiction, can lead to important readjustments to the
stock market, especially for carbon-intensive firms. Hence, the implementation of carbon
pricing at the scale required to deal effectively with climate change, and potential global
coordination on carbon taxes, could lead to important shocks to the financial sectors, if
preemptive measures are not implemented.
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Appendices
A. Other Washington state initiatives on the ballot
In this section, we discuss other state initiatives that were on the ballot together with
I-732 and I-1631. In 2016, Washington state voters were asked to vote on the following
additional initiatives: Initiative 735 (I-735), Initiative 1433 (I-1433), and Initiative 735 (I735). I-735 aimed at regulating political contributions, urging the Washington state
congressional delegation to propose a federal constitutional amendment that reserves
constitutional rights for people and not corporations, in response to Citizens’ United. In
the last month before the vote, opinion polls had 48 percent of the electorate in favor and
18 percent against. With no surprise, I-735 was accepted at 63 percent. I-1433 aimed at
incrementally raising the state’s minimum wage from $9.47 to $13.50 by 2020 and
mandating employers to offer paid sick leave. In the last month before the vote, opinion
polls had 57-62 percent of the electorate in favor and 27-31 percent against. With no
surprise, I-1433 was accepted at 57 percent. I-1464 aimed at revising campaign finance
laws and implement “democracy credits” with which residents could have redirected state
funds towards qualifying candidates. In the last month before the vote, opinion polls had
the largest share of voters as undecided. I-1464 was rejected at 54 percent.
In 2018, Washington state voters were asked to vote on the following additional
initiatives: Initiative 940 (I-940), Initiative 1634 (I-1634), and Initiative 1639 (I-1639). I940 aimed at limiting the use of deadly force by police. The most recent opinion polls
had 68-69 percent of the electorate in favor and 21-18 percent against. With no surprise,
I-1940 was accepted at 60 percent. I-1634 aimed at prohibiting local governments from
enacting taxes on groceries. I-1634 was accepted at 56 percent. I-1639 aimed at
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restricting the purchase and ownership of firearms. In the last month before the vote,
opinion polls had 59 percent of the electorate in favor and 34 percent against. With no
surprise, I-1639 was accepted at 59 percent.
Both in 2016 and 2018, there were also advisory votes on the ballot. Advisory votes
allow voters to share with legislators a preference about policies that are already enacted.
Advisory votes are non-binding. In 2016, Advisory Vote 15 (AV-15) was on the ballot. It
was aimed at repealing House Bill 2778 (HB 2778), which itself aimed to limit sales tax
exemptions to alternative fuel vehicles. Such tax exemptions started in July 2016 and
were supposed to run for three years or until one month after the state would have
reached the goal of 7,500 electric vehicles sold. The proposal was approved at 60 percent,
suggesting legislators repeal HB 2778. In 2018, Advisory Vote 19 (AV19) was also on the
ballot. It was aimed at maintaining Senate Bill 6269 (SB 6269), which itself aimed to
expand the oil response and administration taxes to include pipelines. SB-6269 was
designed as an overall tax of 6 cents per barrel of oil transported via pipelines, estimated
to yield on average around $1.3 million of annual revenues over 10 years. The effect of
the price of oil, let alone the price of gas, would have been in the order of cents of cents.
The total revenues collected by SB 6269 would have been a fraction of what was spent to
promote and oppose I-1631, which, recall, was in the order of about $50 million dollars.
The proposal was rejected at 54 percent, suggesting legislators repeal SB 6269.
As mentioned above, we are not concerned about these other initiatives acting as
confounders for the following three reasons. First, some of them are largely irrelevant for
the stock market, as only a small fraction of the economy is affected by either approval or
rejection. Second, by the ballot date the outcome of most of them was clearly predictable,
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with polls suggesting a clear outcome and the ballot results matching the polls’ forecast
very well. Third, none of the initiatives on the ballot relate directly with the carbon
intensity of firms in the way that initiatives I-732 and I-1631 do. If the ATETs that we
find in the main analyses were driven only by these confounders, then we should not find
any heterogeneity along the carbon-intensity dimension.
Table A.1: Average event effects on Washington-based firms using the market model
Initiative 732
(1)
(2)
(3)
0.076
0.731
0.175
(0.974)
(0.995)
(0.910)

Initiative 1631
(4)
(5)
2.012∗∗
2.326∗∗
(0.811)
(1.112)

(6)
2.072∗
(1.061)

Treatment
Observations
PSM

41
2511
1.945∗∗
(0.963)

32
1959
3.294∗∗∗
(0.850)

32
1959
2.395∗∗
(1.006)

42
2658
2.168∗∗∗
(0.781)

29
2134
1.598
(1.201)

29
2134
1.988∗∗
(0.844)

Treatment
Observations

44
2406

31
1962

31
1534

42
2526

29
2135

29
2027

Industry fixed effects

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Covariate set

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

OLS

Note: This table presents the OLS and PSM estimates for the ATETs where the dependent
variables are 10-days CARs from date 1 to 9 based on market model estimations. Robust
standard errors are in parenthesis. The covariate set includes profitability ratio, leverage
ratio, annual sales growth, market cap, 5-year corporate income tax rate, foreign sales
ratio. Industry-specific fixed effects are based on ICB (the Industry Classification
Benchmark by FTSE International) 1-digit industry classification. Significance levels are
indicated as ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
B. Results with CAPM-adjusted CARs
In this section, we illustrate the robustness of our main results to using CARs based
on the market model and the CAPM. Recall that our main results, presented in the main
body of text, rely on FFM-adjusted CARs. The results from using the market model are
presented in Table A.1. The estimated effects for I-732 are small and insignificant, while
those for I-1631 are around 2 percent and statistically significant. Both in terms of size
and significance, the results are close to the estimation results based on the CAPM
presented in Table 3 in the main text. The results from the market model and the CAPM
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based estimations over time are also similar. In the rest of the section, we then only
present CAPM based estimations.
Figure A.1: ATETs over the event window with CAPM-adjusted CARs

Note: This figure presents the average effects of ballot results for I-732 and I-1631 on
Washington- based firms, together with in-time placebo tests. The event day (date 0) is
denoted by the vertical dashed line. The days prior to the event window are the placeboevent days. The estimation window is the 60 days just prior to the pseudo window. The
95 percent confidence intervals, based on robust standard errors, are indicated with
capped vertical lines.
In Figure A.1, we present placebo and ATETs tests by using CAPM-adjusted CARs.
The estimated pattern for I-1631 is very similar to that obtained with FFM-based
estimations (see Figure 3 in the main body of text). For I-732, the ATET on the first date
is insignificant and small, which corresponds to the results presented in Table 3.
However, over the entire time window the estimated pattern for I-732 with CAPMadjusted CARs also indicates a positive and gradual stock market reaction, which implies
full consistency between CAPM- and FFM-adjusted CARs. The gradual adjustment
pattern observed in this context is consistent with a relatively large amount of
information to be digested after a major election.
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Figure A.2: Differences in the ATETs of I-732 and I-1631 over the event window
with CAPM-adjusted CARs

Note: This figure presents the differences between the average effects of the ballot results
for I-732 and I-1631 on Washington-based firms with above median carbon intensity. The
event day (date 0) is denoted by the vertical dashed line. The days prior to the event
window are used as placebo-event days. The estimation window is given by the 60-day
period prior to the pseudo window. The 90 percent confidence intervals, based on robust
standard errors, are denoted by the capped vertical lines.
In Figure A.1, the differences between the estimated effects of I-732 and I-1631 are, if
anything, larger than those implied by the FFM-based estimations. They also turn out to be
statistically significant over dates 2 and 3, as shown in Figure A.2.
C. Balance of covariates and sensitivity to estimation methods
In this section, we present various diagnostic tests on the ability of our estimators to
establish a balanced control group as well as estimation results from alternative estimation
methods for treatments effects, such as PSM and other approaches from the standard
toolkit. Both OLS and PSM rely on the conditional independence assumption for the
identification of treatment effects (Angrist and Pischke 2009). In this section, we first start
by relaxing the functional form specification imposed by OLS. We implement a regressionbased approach known as doubly robust regression (DRR). In short, DRR is based on
estimating an outcome model with OLS and correcting it for its potential misspecification
with inverse-probability weights, which are obtained by estimating a treatment model.
DRR estimates are unbiased even if one of the two models is misspecified. The rationale
for using DRR is twofold.
48

Table A.2: Overall and covariate balance with DRR by using FFM-adjusted CARs
Covariates / Sample
Leverage ratio
Sales to assets
Annual revenue growth
Log of market cap
Corporate income tax rate
Foreign sales ratio
Tests on overall balance (χ2)

Full
-0.400
-0.152
0.253
-0.098
0.086
-0.364

I-732
Matched
0.001
-0.002
0.004
0.004
0.122
-0.001
5.159

Full
-0.335
0.007
-0.062
-0.130
0.362
-0.145

I-1631
Matched
0.001
0.003
0.000
0.003
0.325
-0.002
3.248

Note: This table presents standardized differences in the means of covariates between the
control and treatment groups in the full and matched samples. The last raw provides the
χ2 statistic to test the null hypothesis that the covariates are balanced across the treatment
and control groups.
First, it provides an additional sensitivity check. Second, it allows us to test balancedness
across treatment levels following a formal test introduced by Imai and Ratkovic (2014).
In what follows, we start with DRR and then complete our series of robustness tests
relying on PSM.
Table A.2 presents the standardized differences in the means of covariates and the
test statistics for overall balance following our DRR approach applied to the ballot
events. Even in the full sample without matching, the standardized differences are close
to zero for half of our covariates for I-732 and all of our covariates for I-1631. In the
matched sample, standardized differences are very close to zero for all the covariates.
Most importantly, for all specifications we cannot reject the null that the covariates are
balanced across the treatment and control groups. The χ2 test statistics, provided in the
last row, are, indeed, very large compared to the standard thresholds used in this exercise.
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Figure A.3: DRR estimations for ATETs over the event window with FFM-adjusted
CARs

Note: This figure presents the average effects of the ballot results for I-732 and I-1631 on
Washington-based firms, together with in-time placebo tests. The event day (date 0) is
denoted by the vertical dashed line. The days prior to the event window are the placeboevent days. The estimation window is the 60 days just prior to the pseudo window. The
95 percent confidence intervals, based on robust standard errors, are indicated with
capped vertical lines.
Following this first sanity check, we use DDR as an alternative specification to test
the robustness of our main results. The main estimates from DDR are presented
graphically in Figure A.3. The estimates are virtually the same as those obtained with
OLS and presented in Figures 3.
Table A.3: Overall and covariate balance with PSM and FFM-adjusted CARs
I-732
Leverage ratio
Sales to assets
Annual revenue growth
Log of market cap
Corporate income tax rate
Foreign sales ratio

Full
-0.400
-0.152
0.253
-0.098
0.086
-0.364

I-1631
Matched
-0.020
0.039
-0.084
0.040
0.275
-0.130

Full
-0.335
0.007
-0.062
-0.130
0.362
-0.145

Matched
0.066
0.058
-0.104
0.033
0.325
-0.074

Note: This table presents standardized differences in the means of covariates between the
control and treatment groups in the full and matched samples.
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We now turn to the estimates from PSM. Following the same approach used with
DDR, we first look at balancing between treatment and control groups and present the
standardized differences in the means of covariates. Table A.3 presents the standardized
differences in the means of covariates following our PSM estimations. The results closely
resemble our previous results from DRRs.
Following our examination of the balancedness between control and treatment
groups, we display the distribution of propensity scores in Figure A.4 for I-732 and in
Figure A.5 for I-1631. In the full sample, the mass of the estimated densities is in the
same region, indicating “common support.” Furthermore, in either case, there is no
probability mass near 1. Given these two observations, there is no evidence that the strict
overlap assumption, which is required for estimating ATETs, is violated. As a result, the
matching procedure balances the propensity scores successfully, as shown in the right
panels of both Figures A.4 and A.5.
Figure A.4: Balance of propensity scores for I-732 with FFM-adjusted CARs

Note: This figure compares the distribution of propensity scores for I-731 across the
treatment and control groups by using the full and matched samples.
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Figure A.5: Balance of propensity scores for I-1631 with FFM-adjusted CARs

Note: This figure compares the distribution of propensity scores for I-1631 across the
treatment and control groups by using the full and matched samples.
Figure A.6: PSM estimations for ATETs over the event window with FFM-adjusted
CARs: Ballot results

Note: This figure presents PSM estimations for the average effects of the ballot results for
I-732 and I-1631 on Washington-based firms, together with in-time placebo tests. The
event day (date 0) is denoted by the vertical dashed line. The event day (date 0) is
indicated with the dashed line. The days prior to the event window are the placebo-event
days. The estimation window is the 60 days just prior to the pseudo window. The 95
percent confidence intervals, based on robust standard errors, are indicated with capped
vertical lines.
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D. Nonparametric inference and in-space placebo tests
In this section, we relax all distributional assumptions and apply a non-parametric
inference strategy to test the robustness of our methodological approach. Our nonparametric inference strategy relies on permutation methods. These tests are applied on
the distribution of a test statistic, which is obtained through the random permutation of
the treatment vector (Imbens and Rubin 2015). In our context, each permutation
randomly assigns firms from the full Russell 3000 sample to either treatment or control
groups, while preserving the original size of both groups.
We realize 1,000 random permutation of the treatment vector and present the results
in Figure A.7. The capped lines indicate the median, 5th percentile, and 95th percentile of
the distribution obtained with the random permutation. For inference purposes, we
compute a p-value based on the rank of the estimated ATET in this empirical distribution.
This p-value gives the probability of estimating, by pure chance, an estimate at least as
large as our estimates for I-732 and I-1631. The results of this non-parametric exercise,
presented in Figure A.7, show that this probability is below 5 percent. These results are
robust to additional checks, such as combining randomization with stratification along
the industry dimension. This additional check ensures that our results are robust also to
random assignment of industries into the treatment group. That is, it confirms that the
results are not driven by potential selection of industry clusters into treatment.
We now turn to another inference strategy suggested by MacKinnon and Webb
(2019), in which we compare the estimated ATETs for I-732 and I-1631 against a
distribution of placebo ATETs estimated from assigning the treatment to the states in the
control group. This approach accounts for potential cross-sectional correlation due to
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treatment assignment in clusters.
In our analysis, we exclude small states with fewer than 10 firms and focus on the
remaining 33 states. Figure A.8 presents the results from these in-space placebo tests.
Similarly to Figure A.7, the capped lines indicate the median, 10th percentile, and 90th
percentile of the distribution of placebo ATETs obtained at each date. Figure A.8 shows
that the estimated effects for I-732 and I-1631 are larger than 90 percent of the placebo
ATETs. Note that, in the same spirit of all other analyses, we take a conservative approach
and include in the distribution the estimated ATETs for Washington State (see MacKinnon
and Webb 2019). We interpret these results akin to the non-parametric p-values from
randomization inference techniques. That is, the probability of observing an estimate at
least as large as our estimates for I-732 and I-1631 is at most 10 percent.
Figure A.7: ATETs over the event window based on FFM-adjusted CARs and
randomization inference

Note: This figure presents the average effects of the ballot results for I-732 and I-1631 on
Washington-based firms, together with in-time placebo tests. The event day (date 0) is
denoted by the vertical dashed line. The days prior to the event window are the placeboevent days. The estimation window is the 60 days just prior to the pseudo window. The
vertical capped lines show the median, 5th percentile, and 95th percentile of permutation
tests.
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Figure A.8: ATETs over the event window based on FFM-adjusted CARs and
inference based on in-space placebo tests

Note: This figure presents the average effects of the ballot results for I-732 and I-1631 on
Washington-based firms, together with in-time placebo tests. The event day (date 0) is
denoted by the vertical dashed line. The days prior to the event window are the placeboevent days. The estimation window is the 60 days just prior to the pseudo window. The
capped lines show the median, 10th percentile, and 90th percentile of in-space placebo
ATETs from assigning the treatment to each state in the US.
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